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the authors' comments. It discusses at length many of the legal issues
raised by the action of Governor Faubus of Arkansas in ordering the
National Guard to prevent by force the carrying out of the federal-court
order relating to the plan of desegregation for the Little Rock public
schools.
With fast-moving developments each month in this area of constitu-
tional law, this or any other book on the subject will virtually require
"advance sheets" if it is to reflect the existing state of the law.
HERBERT BROWNELL, JR.*
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIA. By Charles H. Alexandro-
wicz.1 Bombay: Oxford University Press. I957. Pp. Viii, 255. $3.I5.
PUBLIC LAW PROBLEMS IN INDIA. A Survey Report. Proceedings of
a Conference. Edited by Lawrence F. Ebb.2 Stanford: School of Law,
Stanford University. 1957. Pp. xi, 194. $2.50.
The study of Indian public law is necessarily comparative.3 Such
a study should interest students of American public law, for the strug-
gle with basic problems is a common effort, and the study of Indian
solutions must provide some stimulus to American thought. But, as
Professor Ebb concedes, the value of this comparative study is limited
by the obvious differences in the social contexts; legal institutions trans-
planted from one social landscape to the other are unlikely to flourish.
Professor Alexandrowicz directs the beginner to these differences in
context in his opening discussion of the Indian interpretive method and
approach to constitutional problems. He points out that the Indian
constitution draws upon both English and American experience and is,
in a sense, a compromise between the two traditions. The English tra-
dition has colored the Indian courts' view of themselves: They regard
their role in the constitutional scheme as more modest than that of Amer-
ican courts.4 This is reflected in a constitutional method which re-
sembles more the literal method of English statutory construction.
It is also reflected in a more starched use of precedent in Indian con-
stitutional cases. Although the Supreme Court of India has overruled
one constitutional decision, 5 overruling decisions is regarded for the
* Member of the New York Bar; Former Attorney General of the United States.
'Professor of International and Constitutional Law, University of Madras.
* Associate Professor of Law, Stanford University.
* Dr. Ambedkar, India's first Attorney General, observed in the Constituent
Assembly:
The only new things, if there be any, in a constitution framed so late in the
day are the variations made to remove the faults and to accommodate it to the
needs of the country.
i BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CoNsTiTuriON or INDIA x (3d ed. x955).
" The Indian presidency is another example of compromise: The office is clothed
with powers similar to those provided our President, but no occupant of the office
has exercised these powers except at the direction of the Prime Minister. The
function of the office, thus, more resembles that of the English Crown.
I Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar, Eigss] S.CJ. 672, (India), overruling,
State of Bombay v. United Motors, Ltd., [1953] S.C.J. 373 (India).
most part as a function of the simplified amending process 6 which has
in fact been used to overrule other constitutional decisions of the Su-
preme Court (p. 230) and which, in the English tradition, encourages
a strict regard for stare decisis.
7
Additional differences are demonstrated by a comparison of a lead-
ing Indian case, In re Delhi Laws Act, X912, s which Professor Alex-
androwicz discusses at some length, with the recent decision of our own
Supreme Court in United States v. Sharpnack.9 The Indian case is
rather a series of advisory opinions on a question posed by the Presi-
dent as to the validity of three legislative acts. These acts authorized
the executive to extend to certain provinces controlled by the central
government such legislation as might at the time of the extension be in
force in certain other Indian provinces. The executive was also au-
thorized to restrict and modify the legislation so long as these executive
revisions did not affect its policy, but only the mechanics of its ap-
plication. The majority of the court upheld two of these acts, relying
chiefly on an early decision of the Privy Council.10 Indian legislatures
had for some years extended the power to assimilate legislation to local
governors general and nothing in the Indian constitution condemned the
practice. The third act, however, went further and authorized the ex-
ecutive to repeal or amend the legislation he had selected for extension.
This provision was held invalid as an improper delegation of legislative
power.
In an opinion reminiscent of the Schechter case,' 1 Justice Mukherjea
explained that the question of delegability must be resolved by a
"proper interpretation of the terms of the Constitution itself," but
with a view to the "essential principles underlying the process of law-
making which our Constitution envisages." 12 He then read into the
provision of the constitution vesting the legislative power in the Par-
liament the general rule of nondelegability of the "essential legisla-
tive function" of "declaring the legislative policy and laying down the
standard which is to be enacted into a rule of law" 13 and ruled then
that "to repeal or abrogate an existing law is the exercise of an essen-
tial legislative power, and the policy behind such acts must be the
policy of the legislature itself." 14
One is not disposed to find fault with the Indian court for its ad-
' See INDiA CONST. art. 368. This article provides for amendment by a two-
thirds vote of members present in each House of Parliament (including at least
a majority of the total House membership) except for federal provisions, which
require also the approval of a majority of the state legislatures.
I Cf. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting). The posture chosen by the Indian courts is a striking analogue to
the view of precedent in constitutional cases urged by those who have recently con-
victed our own Court of usurpation.
[ 951] 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747 (India).
355 U.S. 286 (1958).1"Queen v. Burah, 3 App. Cas. 889 (P.C. 1878).
"
1 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (x932).
12 [1951] 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. at 970 (India).
'
31d. at 997.
14 Id. at zoog.
1958] BOOK REVIEWS 1591
5 HARVARD LAW REVIEW
herence to a precedent which went unchallenged in the Constituent
Assembly that drafted the long, well-considered constitution. Neither
is one disposed to criticize the Indian court for the departure from
literal-minded methodology evident in its recognition of the non-
delegability rule. Surely it is true that the rule embodies an important
desideratum of a democratic community- that important political
decisions should be made by officials who are responsible to the elec-
torate and who are held up to its view. And yet the application of
this rule in the Delhi Laws Act case results in a distinction which is
not purposive and which is unlikely to be of help to American courts
despite its vitality in Indian law.15
Indeed, a mechanical application of the rule that a delegate can
assimilate but not repeal would seem to require the invalidation of
our Assimilated Crimes Act, 16 upheld in the Sharpnack case. Under
the provisions of that act, the state legislatures are situated as dele-
gates and their amendments and abrogations are assimilated willy-nilly
into the law of the federal enclave. Application of the Indian rule
would permit Congress to assimilate the first act of its delegate, but not
subsequent changes- no apparent purpose would be served by such
a result. 17
It is concluded that students who are aware of the perplexities and
who are cautious of these differences which sometimes render Indian
problems incomparable to our own may profitably begin a comparative
study with either of these volumes. Though Professor Ebb's collection
of essays is problem oriented and hence more provocative, Professor
Alexandrowicz' book has the merit of continuity and is therefore more
readable. There is very little duplication, so that the effort of reading
both is not wasted.
PAUL D. CARRINGTON *
15 The Supreme Court of India has gone further, perhaps, in striking a partial
assimilation on the ground that the power to delete parts of the assimilated
legislation could not be delegated. See Rainarain v. Patna Administration Comm.,
1954] Sup. Ct. Rep. 569 (India).16 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
1 1I do not mean to assert that the Indian court would necessarily apply
their rule to such a case; there are, of course, important points of difference,
particularly with respect to the character of the delegates.
* Teaching Fellow in Law, Harvard Law School.
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